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PROPENSITY EVIDENCE UNDER RULE 413:
THE NEED FOR BALANCE
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 13, 1994, President Clinton signed the Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (“Crime Bill”) that, among other things,
enacted three new Federal Rules of Evidence: 413, 414 and 415 (“New
Rules”).1 The original version of the Crime Bill did not contain these New Rules
and was narrowly voted down when New York Republican Representative
Susan Molinari joined a coalition of Congressmen who chose to block passage
of the bill.2 Representative Molinari voted against the original bill because it
excluded her proposal to amend the Federal Rules of Evidence for sex offense
cases.3 In late August the legislation came up for a vote again, and despite the
opposition of key Democrats in the House and Senate who feared the New
Rules were unconstitutional, the New Rules finally found their way into Title
XXXII of the Crime Bill.4 In exchange for their inclusion, key Republicans
(including Representative Molinari) voted to pass the legislation.5
These New Rules took effect on July 9, 1995 and relate to the admissibility
of sexual misconduct evidence in cases involving charges of sexual assault and
child molestation. Their purpose is to make prior sexual misconduct evidence
more freely admissible in these cases. Rule 413 admits evidence of similar
crimes in sexual assault cases.6 Rul  414 is similar in structure and content to
1. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §
320935(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 2135-37 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13,701 et seq.).
2. See William Douglas, Right, Left Oppose Crime Bill, NEWSDAY, Aug. 10, 1994, at A19.
3. See 140 CONG. REC. H8991 (daily ed., Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari)
(explaining her original refusal to support the bill). The proposal to amend the Federal Rules of Evidence
for sex offense cases actually originated with senior counsel David J. Karp of the Office of Policy
Development of the Justice Department, but the proposed rules were first introduced in section 231 of the
Sexual Assault Prevention Act, which Representative Molinari and Representative Jon Kyl (R-AZ)
introduced. See H.R. 1149, 102d Cong. § 231 (1991).
4. Ironically, this is the “Miscellaneous” section of the Bill, and these new rules have been anything
but miscellaneous. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322 §
320934 at 352.
5. See Kenneth Cooper, House Negotiators Near Crime Bill Accord, WASH. POST, Aug. 21,
1994, at A1.
6. Rule 413 reads:
Evidence of Similar Crimes in Sexual Assault Cases
(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of sexual assault, evidence of
the defendant’s commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault is admissible, and may be
considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.
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Rule 413, but it applies to child molestation cases rather than sexual assault
cases.7 Finally, Rule 415 applies Rules 413 and 414 to civil cases in which a
claim rests on a party’s alleged sexual assault or child molestation.8
(b) In a case in which the Government intends to offer evidence under this rule, the attorney for the
Government shall disclose the evidence to the defendant, including the statements of witnesses or a
summary of the substance of any testimony that is expected to be offered, at least fifteen days before the
scheduled date of trial or at such later time as the court may allow for good cause.
(c) This rule shall not be construed to limit the admission or consideration of evidence under any
other rule.
(d) For purposes of this rule and Rule 415, “offense of a sexual assault” means a crime under
Federal law or the law of a State (as defined in section 513 of title 18, United States Code) that
involved—
(1) any conduct proscribed by chapter 109A of title 18, United States Code;
(2) contact, without consent, between any part of the defendant’s body or an object and the
genitals or anus of another person;
(3) contact, without consent, between the genitals or anus of the defendant and any part of
another person’s body;
(4) deriving sexual pleasure or gratification from the infliction of death, bodily injury, or
physical pain on another person; or
(5) an attempt or conspiracy to engage in conduct described in paragraphs (1)-(4).
FED. R. EVID. 413.
7. Rule 414 reads:
Evidence of Similar Crimes in Child Molestation Cases
(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of child molestation, evidence
of the defendant’s commission of another offense or offenses of child molestation is admissible, and may
be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.
(b) In a case in which the Government intends to offer evidence under this rule, the attorney for the
Government shall disclose the evidence to the defendant, including statements of witnesses or a summary
of the substance of any testimony that is expected to be offered, at least fifteen days before the scheduled
date of trial or at such later time as the court may allow for good cause.
(c) This rule shall not be construed to limit the admission or consideration of evidence under any
other rule.
(d) For purposes of this rule and Rule 415, “child” means a person below the age of fourteen, and
“offense of child molestation” means a crime under Federal law or the law of a State (as defined in
section 513 of title 18, United States Code) that involved—
(1) any conduct proscribed by chapter 109A of title 18, United States Code, that was
committed in relation to a child;
(2) any conduct proscribed by chapter 110 of title 18, United States Code;
(3) contact between any part of the defendant’s body or an object and the genitals or anus of a
child;
(4) contact between the genitals or anus of the defendant and any part of the body of a child;
(5) deriving sexual pleasure or gratification from the infliction of death, bodily injury, or
physical pain on a child; or
(6) an attempt or conspiracy to engage in conduct described in paragraphs (1)-(5).
FED. R. EVID. 414.
8. Rule 415 reads:
Evidence of Similar Acts in Civil Cases Concerning Sexual Assault or Child Molestation
(a) In a civil case in which a claim for damages or other relief is predicated on a party’s alleged
commission of conduct constituting an offense of sexual assault or child molestation, evidence of that
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These New Rules are a dramatic change to the traditional rules of evidence.
Prior to the enactment of the New Rules, a prosecutor could not corroborate a
victim’s story by asking whether a defendant had engaged in prior sexual
misconduct. Indeed, the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) codified the
traditional common law rule against character evidence in the first sentence of
FRE 404(b), which reads: “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith.”9 The new rules purport to lift the Rule 404(b) restriction
against character evidence by permitting a court to consider evidence of a
certain type of prior act “for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.”10
A prosecutor may now offer evidence of such prior acts to show that the
defendant is the sort of person who would engage in sexual misconduct.11 These
New Rules seem to conflict with the fundamental principle of Anglo-Saxon
jurisprudence that a person “must be tried for what he did, not for who he is.”12
party’s commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault or child molestation is admissible and
may be considered as provided in Rule 413 and Rule 414 of these rules.
(b) A party who intends to offer evidence under this Rule shall disclose the evidence to the party
against whom it will be offered, including statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any
testimony that is expected to be offered, at least fifteen days before the scheduled date of trial or at such
later time as the court may allow for good cause.
(c) This rule shall not be construed to limit the admission or consideration of evidence under any
other rule.
FED. R. EVID. 415.
9. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
10. FED. R. EVID. 413(a); see, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 103 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir.
1996) (explaining that Congress added Rules 413, 414 and 415 to make evidence of similar sexual crimes
or acts expressly admissible without regard to Rule 404(b)).
11. Senator Dole’s statement on the floor of the Senate is relevant in this regard: “I think if
somebody is a repeat offender, if you brought in eight or nine women, for example . . . and he had one
offense after another, it would be probative.” 139 CONG. REC. S15,020-01, S15,073 (daily ed. Nov. 4,
1993) (statement of Sen. Dole). One commentator offers the following hypothetical closing statement that
a prosecuting attorney could make to a jury, arguing that this type of closing argument would
dramatically increase the risk of jury misuse of the evidence:
Ladies and gentlemen, consider the evidence of the three other sexual attacks committed by the accused.
That evidence shows you the type of person he is. It proves to you that he is a vicious man. Think back to
Ms. Grant’s testimony about how—without any provocation—the accused just grabbed her, slammed
her against a wall, and then threw her down on the ground. The evidence also demonstrates beyond any
doubt that he is a violent man. Think about the testimony by Ms. Martinez and Ms. Barton—the
testimony about the serious injuries which the accused inflicted on them. This evidence shows you that
that accused is precisely the kind of vicious, violent person who would commit the rape that he’s now on
trial for. He is disposed to rape. Simply stated, he’s a rapist. He’s that sort of criminal, and that’s exactly
what he did in this case.
Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Small Contribution to the Debate Over the Proposed Legislation Abolishing
the Character Evidence Prohibition in Sex Offense Prosecutions, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1125, 1146-47
(1993).
12. United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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Because of problems like this, all three New Rules have been the subject of
much criticism and debate.13 Most commentators oppose the New Rules,
arguing that they undermine the integrity and rationality of the Federal Rules of
Evidence;14 that Congress enacted the New Rules solely because of political
pressures to “get tough on crime” and are, therefore, poorly drafted and vague;15
that Congress employed an improper process to enact the New Rules;16 that the
13. See, e.g., Dale A. Nance, Foreword: Do We Really Want to Know the Defendant?, 70 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 3, 11 (1994) (summarizing arguments against Rules 413-415). For those commentators
who support the new rules, see Debra Sherman Tedeschi, Federal Rule of Evidence 413: Redistributing
“The Credibility Quotient,” 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 107, 123 (1995); Karen M. Fingar, And Justice For All:
The Admissibility of Uncharged Sexual Misconduct Evidence Under the Recent Amendment to the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 501, 510 (1996) (arguing that
“[e]very state in the United States should incorporate the recent legislation into its evidence code in order
to achieve increased consistency and intellectual honesty in the law regarding the admissibility of
uncharged sexual misconduct evidence, and provide greater justice for victims of sex crimes”).
14. See James S. Liebman, Proposed Evidence Rules 413 to 415—Some Problems and
Recommendations, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 753, 755-57 (1995). Professor Liebman argues that because
the new rules permit admission of propensity evidence in sexual assault and child molestation cases, they
directly conflict with Rule 404, which generally proscribes using evidence of character traits to prove
action in conformity therewith. See id. See also James Joseph Duane, The New Federal Rules of
Evidence on Prior Acts of Accused Sex Offenders: A Poorly Drafted Version of a Very Bad Idea, 157
F.R.D. 95, 111-13 (1994) (asserting that Rules 413-415 will make the Federal Rules of Evidence
inconsistent and inexplicable); David P. Leonard, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Political
Process, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 341 (1995) (stating that the new rules make evidence law more
complex and detract from its truth-finding purpose).
15. See, e.g., Joseph A. Aluise, Evidence of Prior Sexual Misconduct in Sexual Assault and Child
Molestation Proceedings: Did Congress Err in Passing Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415?,
14 J.L. & POL. 153, 156 (1998) (arguing that these New Rules are poorly drafted because they were
quickly pushed through Congress in an effort to respond to the horror stories of “sexual predators” who
repeatedly raped and molested but were never convicted for their crimes); Michael S. Ellis, The Politics
Behind Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 961, 962 (1998)
(emphasizing “the inappropriate means through which the rules were enacted, the poor manner in which
they were drafted, and the weak substantive foundation on which they are based”); Report of the Judicial
Conference on the Admission of Character Evidence in Certain Sexual Misconduct Cases (submitted to
Congress in accordance with section 32,0935 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322), reprinted in 159 F.R.D. 51, 52 (1995) [hereinafter Report of the Judicial
Conference] (noting that an overwhelming majority of judges, lawyers, law professors and legal
organizations objected to the New Rules because of numerous drafting problems and because the New
Rules would allow the admittance of prejudicial evidence); Duane, supra note 14, at 115-22 (asserting
that the New Rules are ambiguous in scope and improperly override a number of other Federal Rules of
Evidence); Liebman, supra note 14, at 759-60 (suggesting that the drafters did not intend for the awkward
procedure that results from the language used in the New Rules).
16. See, e.g., Myrna S. Raeder, American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section Report to the
House of Delegates, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 343, 343-44 (1995) (recommending that the ABA oppose
Rules 413-415, in part because of Congress’s bypassing the procedures of the Rules Enabling Act);
Duane, supra note 14, at 95-97 (discussing the manner in which Congress enacted Rules 413-415);
Liebman, supra note 14, at 757 (noting that Congress did not subject the rules to appropriate study,
Congressional hearings, or consideration by the Supreme Court or its Advisory Committee on Federal
Rules).
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New Rules violate the Due Process Clause of the Constitution;17 that the New
Rules violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution;18 and that existing
Federal Rules of Evidence (such as Rule 403) may not apply at all to evidence
submitted pursuant to Rules 413-15.19
Despite overwhelming criticism of these New Rules, the fact remains that
Congress has enacted these rules and is unlikely to repeal them. These rules are
now a part of the official Federal Rules of Evidence and may be used in any
federal court in the United States. Critics should now shift their attention to the
fair application of these rules. To this end, commentators must analyze the way
courts are using these New Rules and determine how these rules should be
balanced against the other Federal Rules of Evidence.
There is no doubt, however, that the proper balance will be very difficult to
achieve. Rape, sexual assault and child molestation are all complicated and
emotional topics.20 Any discussion of how these New Rules should be balanced
17. See, e.g., Mark A. Sheft, Federal Rule of Evidence 413: A Dangerous New Frontier, 33 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 57, 82 (1995) (“Rule 413 erodes the presumption of innocence in violation of the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause”); Margaret C. Livnah, Branding the Sexual Predator: Constitutional
Ramifications of Federal Rules of Evidence 413 Through 415, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 169, 181 (1996)
(“The risk of due process violation [under Rules 413-415] is increased by the potential that a jury will be
prejudiced by explicit reference to prior bad sexual acts”); Louis M. Natali, Jr. & R. Stephen Stigall, “Are
You Going to Arraign His Whole Life?”: How Sexual Propensity Evidence Violates the Due Process
Clause, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 3-4 (1996) (arguing that Rules 413-415 “violate the Due Process Clause
because they contravene the prohibition of propensity evidence so deeply embedded in the United States
Constitution”); Jason L. McCandless, Note, Prior Bad Acts and Two Bad Rules: The Fundamental
Unfairness of Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 689 (1997)
(asserting that the “use of ‘propensity evidence’ violates the Due Process Clause because it is
‘fundamentally unfair’”).
18. Duane, supra note 14, at 113-15. Professor Duane argues that Rules 413-415 will have a
disproportionate impact on Native Americans because commission of sexual assault or child molestation is
a federal offense only if the act occurs on federal property, and all Indian reservations in the United States
are located on federal property. See id. at 114. Although the racially disparate impact of the rules does
not, by itself, amount to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, Rules 413-415 disproportionately
target Native Americans and, therefore, have significant racial implications. See Duane, supra note 14, at
114-15.
19. See, e.g., Tedeschi, supra note 13, at 122 (illustrating the broad language of Rule 413 and the
fact that the new rule does not indicate whether or not this broad language trumps the Rule 403 ability of a
judge to exclude evidence that is more prejudicial than probative); David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park,
“Other Crimes” Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L. REV. 529, 566 (1994) (“Whether
exclusion under Rule 403 would still be available to an accused seeking to challenge the admissibility of
this evidence is unclear.”); Leonard, supra note 14, at 333 n.140 (“There are numerous ambiguities in the
[new] rules. This makes it difficult to determine their precise scope.”).
20. The number of known rapes committed in 1992 alone was 140,930. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 1973-1992
TRENDS 19 (1994). Recent data determined that one out of five women is likely to be raped in her
lifetime. See MARY P. KOSS & MARY R. HARVEY, THE RAPE VICTIM: CLINICAL AND
COMMUNITY INTERVENTIONS 29 (2d ed. 1991). “[R]ape prevalence of approximately 20% for
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against the existing rules of evidence must consider such complicated factors as
statistics, empirical data, beliefs, opinions and societal norms.21 Although
achieving such a balance will be difficult, it is nevertheless important to attempt
to balance the Congressional intent behind these new rules with the defendant’s
right to a fair trial.22
This Note specifically examines the interplay of Rule 413 and Rule 403,23
which allows exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion,
or waste of time.24 Part II examines the common law history of the character
evidence ban (now codified under FRE 404) and the judicial authority to
exclude certain evidence under Rule 403 despite its relevance. Part II also
examines the history and legislative intent behind Rule 413. Part III looks at
how federal courts have attempted to balance Rule 413 with Rule 403. Finally,
Part IV proposes that federal courts should not admit evidence under Rule 413
merely because the evidence may have probative value. Instead, courts should
adult women has been reported by four separate groups of investigators working in different regions of the
United States.” Id.
Data gathered by the FBI indicates that the rate of increase for rape has far outpaced the rate of
increase for other crimes. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 102D CONG., REPORT ON
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: THE INCREASE OF RAPE IN AMERICA 2-4 (Comm. Print 1990). Despite this
increase, however, 98% of victims of sex crimes never see their attacker apprehended, tried or imprisoned.
See 139 CONG. REC. S15,070 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1993) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
21. See infra notes 76, 78 and 80.
22. Practical considerations also advocate an attempt to balance Rule 413 against the existing Rules
of Evidence. These New Rules potentially act as a model for state evidence codes. Currently, thirty-four
states and Puerto Rico have adopted evidentiary rules modeled on the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Joan
L. Larsen, Of Propensity, Prejudice, and Plain Meaning: The Accused’s Use of Exculpatory Specific
Acts Evidence and the Need to Amend Rule 404(b), 87 NW. U.L. REV. 651, 652-53 n.8 (1993). The
states adopting and adapting the Federal Rules of Evidence are: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Furthermore, some states have selectively adopted the Federal Rules of
Evidence through case law. See id. See also L. Kinvin Wroth, The Federal Rules of Evidence in the
States: A Ten-Year Perspective, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1315 (1985). While the crime addressed by Rule 413,
sexual assault, is typically prosecuted in state courts, it is important nevertheless to examine how federal
courts balance Rule 413 with Rule 403 and then offer a solution as to how state courts should be
balancing these rules. If the federal courts are able to strike the proper balance between Rule 413 and Rule
403, perhaps more states would willingly adopt Rule 413. At this time, only one state has a rule similar to
Rule 413. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 (West Supp. 1999). Two states have rules similar to Rule 414.
See MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.025 (West Supp. 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-15 (West 1998).
23. Rule 403 reads: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” FED.
R. EVID. 403.
24. This Note concentrates on Rule 413 because Rules 414 and 415 are modeled on Rule 413. In
addition, this Note focuses on the proper balance of Rule 413 with Rule 403, the rule governing
admissibility of evidence at trial.
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limit the prejudicial effect of propensity evidence by using conferences outside
the presence of the jurors, in conjunction with Rule 403 and jury instructions.
This will balance the Congressional intent behind Rule 413 with the defendant’s
right to a fair trial, a policy that underlies Rule 403 and the rest of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
A. The Traditional Common Law Ban on Character Evidence
A fundamental principle of evidence law is that a person is tried for his
specific acts, not for his bad character.25 This approach to character, or
propensity, evidence finds its roots in Anglo-Saxon criminal jurisprudence26 as
early as seventeenth century England.27 Two of the earliest English cases to
address the ban on character evidence were Hampden’s Trial28 and Harrison’s
Trial.29 Both of these cases refused to allow evidence of the defendants’ prior
bad acts because, as one of the courts stated, “we would not suffer any raking
into men’s course of life, to pick up evidence that they cannot be prepared to
answer to.”30
Even at common law, however, the ban against character evidence remained
incomplete.31 For example, in order to establish the accused’s intent, the law
admitted evidence of any overt act that furthered an alleged conspiracy;32 to
establish the author’s identity in a prosecution for writing threatening letters to
25. See Mary Katherine Danna, The New Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415: The Prejudice of
Politics or Just Plain Common Sense?, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 277 (1996).
26. See, e.g., Julius Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England, 46 HARV. L.
REV. 954 (1933) (tracing the English history of the character evidence rule and its major exceptions);
Julius Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. REV. 988 (1938)
(explaining in detail the American character evidence rule and similar acts exception).
27. See 1A JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 58.2, at 1213 (Tillers
ed., rev. ed. 1983); OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ‘TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE’
SERIES, REPORT NO. 4, The Admission of Criminal Histories at Trial (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 707, 716-17 (1989) [hereinafter OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY].
28. 9 Cob. St. Tr. 1053 (K.B. 1684).
29. 12 How. St. Tr. 834 (Old Bailey 1692) (Holt, L.C.J.). When the prosecution attempted to offer
propensity evidence against the defendant, Justice Holt remarked: “Hold, what are you doing now? Are
you going to arraign his whole life? Away, away, that ought not to be; that is nothing to the matter.” Id. at
864.
30. Hampden’s Trial, 9 Cob. St. Tr. at 1103.
31. See Thomas J. Reed, Trial By Propensity: Admission of Other Criminal Acts Evidenced in
Federal Criminal Trials, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 713, 718 (1981).
32. See Rex v. Horne Tooke, 25 St. Tr. 1, 27, 455 (1794).
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extort money it admitted evidence of similar letters written by the defendant;33
and to prove the absence of mistake in prosecutions for counterfeiting it
admitted evidence indicating that the accused had previously passed counterfeit
money.34 Thus, the common law ban against character evidence simply
prohibited a certain type of reasoning: an inference that because the defendant
committed prior acts, he is therefore a “bad person” and more likely to have
committed the crime charged.35
Colonial courts in this country later adopted the ban against character
evidence. For example, in Rex v. Doaks,36 the defendant was indicted for
keeping a brothel.37 The prosecution sought to introduce evidence of the
accused’s prior lustful and lewd acts, but the court refused to admit this
propensity evidence.38 Nevertheless, as in England, early American courts
continued to make exceptions for the admission of certain kinds of propensity
evidence.39
Unlike English cases, however, early American cases relied on an additional
rationale for excluding propensity evidence: fear that evidence of prior acts
might lead a jury to convict the defendant solely for his propensity to commit
such a crime or because he had not been punished for his prior acts.40 Because
of this fear, American common law maintained a strong rule prohibiting
33. See 2 E. EAST, A TREATISE OF PLEAS OF THE CROWN 1110 (1803). One author lists a number
of other exceptions:
Similarly, when prosecuting one accused of forgery, the crown’s counsel could offer evidence indicating
that on prior occasions the accused had passed forged notes in order to establish the defendant’s
knowledge and intent. . . . The crown’s counsel also could offer evidence that one accused of maintaining
a disorderly house had kept a similar establishment at another location in order to show the continuing
nature of the criminal operation. . . . [T]he crown’s counsel could cross-examine the defense’s character
witnesses by probing the witness’ familiarity with the defendant’s prior criminal activity.
Reed, supra note 31, at 718 (citations omitted).
34. See Rex v. Ball, 170 Eng. Rep. 973 (Crown Courts 1808).
35. See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 2:18, at 2-97 (1996 &
Supp. 1998). The concern with this inference lies in the jury’s potential to overestimate the relevance of
the uncharged misconduct evidence. See id. Wigmore explains the rationale for the rule by stating: “It
may almost be said that it is because of the indubitable relevancy of specific bad acts showing the
character of the accused that such evidence is excluded. It is objectionable not because it has no
appreciable probative value but because it has too much.” 1A WIGMORE, supra note 26, § 58.2 at 1212.
36. Quincy’s Mass. Repts. 90 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1763).
37. See id. at 91.
38. See id.
39. For example, the defendant on trial for passing counterfeit money in State v. Van Houten argued
that the court could not admit evidence that he had previously passed counterfeit money. The court
rejected this argument and admitted the evidence to establish the defendant’s knowledge. The court
cautioned, however, that the evidence could not be admitted as circumstantial evidence of the accused’s
conduct. See 3 N.J. (2 Penn.) 248 (1810).
40. See, e.g., People v. Stout, 4 Park. Crim. 71 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1858).
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evidence offered to show action in conformity with character. At the same time,
American courts permitted evidence of prior acts offered for non-propensity
purposes such as motive, intent, absence of mistake, common scheme or plan,
and identity.41
The leading case exemplifying American common law is People v.
Molineux,42 where the New York Court of Appeals developed a framework for
the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence. The court prefaced its
discussion by noting that “[t]he general rule of evidence applicable to criminal
trials is that the state cannot prove against a defendant any crime not alleged in
the indictment, either as a foundation for a separate punishment, or as aiding the
proofs that he is guilty of the crime charged.”43
Nevertheless, the court found that if there was a substantial issue of the
defendant’s motive, a question of the defendant’s identity or intent, the
possibility of the defendant’s participation in a general criminal plan or scheme
to commit similar crimes, or a particular modus operandi, the prosecution could
offer specific prior acts of the defendant, provided that the prejudicial value of
the evidence did not outweigh its probative effect.44 Th  court reasoned that
these exceptions were permissible because the evidence offered under them was
offered not for impermissible character purposes, but rather for other facts at
issue in the crime charged.45
Courts have employed the Molineux rationale to justify the admission of
uncharged sex offenses in cases charging the defendant with rape, child
molestation, incest or sodomy.46 Today, those states that have adopted the
Molineux rule view it as a specialized rule of relevance allowing admission of
the defendant’s previous misconduct, when relevant, to prove some intermediate
issue such as a general plan or scheme to commit sex offenses,47 intent,48
41. See 2 WIGMORE, supra note 27, § 357, at 336.
42. 61 N.E. 286 (N.Y. 1901).
43. Id. at 293 (citation omitted). The Molineux court believed that the character evidence ban was
one of the most important characteristics distinguishing the common law from civil law systems. See id. at
300.
44. See id. at 302.
45. See id. at 294.
46. See, e.g., Shelby v. State, 340 So. 2d 847, 848 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976) (admitting evidence of
rape of a second victim to show res gestae when the first victim had been raped both before and after the
second victim); People v. Oliver, 365 N.E.2d 618, 625 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (admitting evidence of
defendant’s proximity to establish identity, common scheme, and design); Commonwealth v. Helfant, 496
N.E.2d 433, 442 (Mass. 1986) (admitting evidence of a physician’s prior use of Valium to sedate patients
before assault to establish pattern); State v. Sterling, 516 P.2d 87, 88-89 (Or. Ct. App. 1973) (admitting
similar rapes of two teenage girls to show identity).
47. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654, 663 (Fla. 1959) (admitting prior assault to show
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motive49 or the identity of the perpetrator.50
In contrast to the states following the Molineaux rule, some states created a
“lustful disposition” exception where the prosecution may use the defendant’s
prior acts to show that the defendant had a tendency to act in conformity with a
specific lustful character trait.51 The theory proposed that the defendant has a
propensity, evidenced by his prior sexual conduct, for deviant sexual behavior,
thus making it more likely that the defendant committed the charged offense.52
plan, scheme, or design); State v. Maylett, 701 P.2d 291, 293 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (admitting alleged
attacks on other victims to show a common plan if within one year of charged offense); People v. Oliver,
365 N.E.2d 618, 625 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (admitting evidence of defendant’s proximity to establish
common scheme and design); People v. Garland, 393 N.W.2d 896, 898 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (admitting
evidence to show prior scheme). But see Wimberly v. State, 348 S.E.2d 692, 694 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)
(holding twelve year old rape conviction was too remote to show plan or design).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Cuch, 842 F.2d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir. 1988) (admitting prior rapes as
evidence of intent); People v. Oliphant, 250 N.W.2d 443, 449 (Mich. 1976) (admitting evidence of other
acts when intent at issue); State v. Holden, 414 N.W.2d 516, 520 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (admitting
evidence of acts committed outside statute of limitation to show prior intent); State v. Means, 363 N.W.2d
565, 569 (S.D. 1985) (admitting prior molestation to show specific intent). But see State v. Christensen,
414 N.W.2d 843, 847 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987) (holding evidence of lack of consent of previous victim
inadmissible to show intent with respect to later victim).
49. See, e.g., People v. Adrian, 744 P.2d 768, 769 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) (admitting evidence to
show common motive and modus operandi); Burnett v. State, 225 S.E.2d 28, 30 (Ga. 1976) (admitting
testimony of four witnesses about similar prior conduct to show motive or scheme); State v. Maylett, 701
P.2d 291, 293 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (admitting evidence of prior sexual acts in a child sexual abuse case
to show motive or common scheme); State v. Smith, 530 P.2d 1215, 1219 (Kan. 1975) (admitting
evidence of prior convictions to show motive); State v. Adams, 513 A.2d 854, 856 (Me. 1986) (admitting
prior sexual misconduct to show motive); State v. Whitman, 475 N.E.2d 486, 489 (Ohio. Ct. App. 1984)
(admitting evidence of other acts to show motive).
50. See, e.g., People v. Whittington, 141 Cal. Rptr. 742, 747 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (admitting
evidence of other crimes to prove identity); State v. Lopez, 458 P.2d 851, 853 (N.M. Ct. App. 1969)
(admitting evidence of subsequent rape within hour in same vicinity when identity is at issue); Eberhart v.
State, 727 P.2d 1374, 1380 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986) (admitting evidence of prior conviction to show
identity); White v. State, 533 S.W.2d 735, 743 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975) (admitting evidence of prior
rapes when defendant’s identity is at issue).
51. See EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 190, at 560-61 (3d ed., 1984); 2
WIGMORE, supra note 27, §§ 398-402. The name of this exception comes from State v. Ferrand, 27 So.
2d 174, 176 (La. 1946), but is also often referred to as the “depraved sexual instinct” rule and the “lustful
inclination” rule. See Woods v. State, 235 N.E.2d 479, 486 (Ind. 1968); State v. Schut, 429 P.2d 126,
128 (Wash. 1967).
52. See, e.g., State v. Haston, 166 P.2d 141, 143 (Ariz. 1946) (admitting prior acts of incest as
evidence of defendant’s lustful disposition); Pounds v. United States, 529 A.2d 791, 794 (D.C. 1987)
(allowing exception to show predisposition to seek gratification with a particular victim); Brooks v. State,
242 So. 2d 865, 869 (Miss. 1971) (admitting evidence of prior sexual acts to show defendant’s lustful
disposition in statutory rape case); State v. Seymour, 57 P.2d 390, 392 (Nev. 1936) (admitting prior
sexual act evidence to show defendant’s incestuous disposition); State v. Mankiller, 722 P.2d 1183, 1191
(N.M. Ct. App. 1986) (admitting evidence of child molestation to prove lewd and lascivious disposition);
Moore v. Commonwealth, 278 S.E.2d 822, 825 (Va. 1981) (admitting evidence to show incestuous
disposition); State v. Ray, 806 P.2d 1220, 1229 (Wash. 1991) (admitting collateral sexual misconduct to
show defendant’s lustful disposition toward victim).
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Today, twenty-nine states follow some version of this “lustful disposition”
doctrine.53
Despite the exceptions to the rule against propensity evidence, the Supreme
Court has consistently expressed its approval of the common law rule barring
propensity evidence.54 In 1948 the Supreme Court in Michelson v. United
States55 gave its strongest approval yet of the common law rule barring
propensity evidence. Justice Jackson, writing for the Court, reasoned that:
Courts that follow the common law tradition almost unanimously have
come to disallow resort by the prosecution to any kind of evidence of a
defendant’s evil character to establish the probability of his guilt. . . . The
state may not show defendant’s prior trouble with the law, specific
criminal acts, or ill name among his neighbors, even though such facts
might logically be persuasive that he is by propensity a probable
perpetrator of the crime. The inquiry is not rejected because character is
irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and
to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and
deny him opportunity to defend against a particular charge.56
More recently, Huddleston v. United States discussed this ban on propensity
evidence.57
53. The states that still recognize the lustful disposition exception to the general bar against
character evidence are: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Note that some commentators argue that the cases
espousing the lustful disposition doctrine are arguably no longer good law in the states which have
adopted Rule 404(b). See Imwinkelried, supra note 11, at 1127; Byron N. Miller, Note, Admissibility of
Other Offense Evidence After State v. Houghton, 25 S.D. L. REV. 166 n.1 (1980); David F. Snively,
Note, Time for Change: Evidentiary Safeguards Needed in Trials for Sexual Offenses, 11 IND. L. REV.
895, 910 (1978).
54. One of the earliest cases was Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450 (1892). The Court reasoned
that prior crimes evidence of prior robberies committed by the defendants was inadmissible because it
would unduly prejudice the defendants by impressing upon the jurors the notion that the defendants were
undeserving of certain prescribed trial protections. See id. at 458.
55. 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
56. Id. at 475-76.
57. 485 U.S. 681 (1988). The Court noted its “concern” that evidence of prior bad acts and crimes
admitted under the present exceptions to Rule 404(b) might carry a risk of “unfair prejudice,” but for a
number of detailed safeguards contained in the current rules against the possible misuse of such evidence
to prove a defendant’s bad character. Id. at 691. Wigmore states four main rationales for this prohibition
against character evidence: such evidence has little probative value; it “diverts the jury’s attention from
the merits of the case by inducing it to punish or reward a party for being good or bad in general;” adverse
character evidence saddles one involved in legal proceedings with disabilities because of previous
misconduct; and the use of such evidence “violates a social commitment to the thesis that each person
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B. The Federal Rules of Evidence and Rule 404
In 1975, as part of enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence,58 Rule 404
codified the common law character evidence ban and its exceptions.59 Congress
intended the original drafting of the Federal Rules of Evidence to adopt common
law rules that had developed by the late 1960s.60 Therefore, Rule 404(a)
generally prohibits circumstantial use of character evidence.61 Rule 404(b)
remains mentally free and autonomous at every point in his life.” 1A WIGMORE, supra note 27, § 54.1, at
1150-51.
58. The Federal Rules of Evidence became effective on July 1, 1975. Act of January 2, 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2215.
59. Rule 404 states:
Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct; Exceptions; Other Crimes
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not
admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, or by
the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of
peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the
victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in rules 607, 608,
and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in
a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at
trial.
FED. R. EVID. 404.
60. For a history of the drafting of the Federal Rules of Evidence, see 21 CHARLES A. WRIGHT &
KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5006 (West 1977). The
Uniform Rules of Evidence and the American Law Institute Model Code of Evidence also influenced the
drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The language of 404(b), for example, is very similar to the
wording of Rule 5 of the Uniform Rules and Rule 311 of the Model Code. See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RULES OF
EVIDENCE: A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE ADVISABILITY AND FEASIBILITY OF DEVELOPING UNIFORM
RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 53 (1962), reprinted in 1 JAMES F.
BAILEY, III & OSCAR M. TRELLES, II, THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES
AND RELATED DOCUMENTS, at Doc. 4 (1980).
61. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a). The concern, as indicated by the above discussion of the common law
precedent, is that the jury will convict the defendant because he or she is a bad person who should be
punished for his or her prior bad acts. One author explains:
[E]vidence that an individual is the kind of person who tends to behave in certain ways almost always has
some value as circumstantial evidence as to how he acted (and perhaps with what state of mind) in the
matter in question. . . . Yet, evidence of character in any form—reputation, opinion from observation, or
specific acts—generally will not be received to prove that a person engaged in certain conduct or did so
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prohibits evidence of a defendant’s prior uncharged misconduct offered to prove
that the defendant acted in conformity with his character, but allows the
evidence if it is introduced for a purpose other than showing propensity to
commit the alleged offense.62 Some acceptable purposes include, but are not
limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.63 Rul  403 governs character
evidence admitted for these purposes.64
C. Rule 403’s Background and Common Law Heritage
The common law recognized that certain circumstances called for the
exclusion of relevant evidence.65 Rul  403 codifies the common law powers of
the trial judge and explicitly gives the judge discretion in determining what
evidence to admit based on the evidence’s probative value and undesirable
effect.66 Where the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, undue consumption of
time, or misleading the jury outweighs the probative value of evidence, the judge
may exclude the evidence even though it is relevant.67 At its core, the rule leaves
with a particular intent on a specific occasion, so-called circumstantial use of character. The reason is the
familiar one of prejudice outweighing probative value.
MCCORMICK, supra note 51, § 188, at 554.
62. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). See also Waters v. Kassulke, 916 F.2d 329, 336 (6th Cir. 1990)
(holding collateral offense evidence inadmissible to prove propensity, but admissible to prove knowledge
and intent); United States v. Hadley, 918 F.2d 848, 850 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that Rule 404(b) is an
inclusionary rule permitting prior bad act evidence except to prove propensity).
63. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). The enumerated exceptions listed in Rule 404(b) encompass the
common-law exceptions, but courts have held that they are not exclusive. See, e.g., United States v.
Powers, 59 F.3d 1460, 1464 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting enumerated list of permissible purposes under Rule
404(b) should be construed broadly and considered inclusive, not exclusive), United States v. Mendez-
Ortiz, 810 F.2d 76, 79 (6th Cir. 1986) (recognizing that the list of enumerated permissible uses of prior
bad act evidence under Rule 404(b) is “neither exhaustive nor conclusive”); United States v. Aleman, 592
F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir. 1979) (reasoning extrinsic act evidence is admissible if relevant to an issue other
than the accused’s character).
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide for other exceptions as well. Impeachment by a prior
conviction is one example. The prosecution can use the prior conviction to show that the witness on the
stand has the propensity to lie, but not the propensity to engage in similar conduct. See FED. R. EVID.
609(a). A witness may also be impeached by prior bad acts if the acts are probative of truthfulness. See
FED. R. EVID. 608(b). One also may show character by reputation, opinion, or specific instances of prior
conduct where character is a central element of the case. See FED. R. EVID. 405. Such cases where
character is a central element of the case are, however, rare.
64. See FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note, 56 F.R.D. 219, 221 (“The determination
must be made whether the danger of undue prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence in
view of the availability of other means of proof and other factors appropriate for making decisions of this
kind under Rule 403.”).
65. See FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note, 56 F.R.D. at 218.
66. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
67. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & MICHAEL M. MARTIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL
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the judge with a large discretionary role in controlling the introduction of
evidence, so as to generally regulate the course and speed of the trial and
prevent jury “misdecision.”68
There has been some dispute, however, as to the proper standard for
balancing probative value against prejudicial effect under Rule 403. Judge
Weinstein and Professor Berger argue that courts should “give the evidence its
maximum reasonable probative force and its minimum reasonable prejudicial
value.”69 Professor Dolan, however, recommends that courts “resolve all doubts
concerning the balance between probative value and prejudice in favor of
prejudice.”70 In the end, most courts faced with the question of the proper
standard have chosen not to resolve the issue.71
D. The Adoption of Rule 413
Senator Robert Dole and Representative Susan Molinari first proposed the
New Rules in 1991 as part of the Women’s Equal Opportunity Act.72 The
customary method for passing amendments to federal procedural rules is
160 (5th ed. 1990).
68. See, e.g., Old Chief v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997). The Court described the type of
unfair prejudice meant to be weighed by the trial judge under Rule 403 as that which generalizes a
defendant’s earlier bad act into bad character and takes that as raising the odds that he did the later bad act
for which he is now charged (or, worse, as calling for a preventive conviction even if he should happen to
be innocent momentarily). The Court went on to say that in accomplishing this weighing, the trial judge
must evaluate the offered evidence within the full context of available evidence, evaluating the degrees of
probative value and unfair prejudice not only for the item in question but also for any available
substitutes. In this way, the offered evidence could be treated as having less probative value than it would
have had on its own if it was part of a case that could include other less prejudicial methods of establishing
the point for which it has proper relevance. See also Cook v. Hoppin, 783 F.2d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 1986)
(“Rule 403 was never intended to exclude relevant evidence simply because it is detrimental to one party’s
case; rather, ‘the relevant inquiry is whether any unfair prejudice from the evidence substantially
outweighs its probative value.’”) (emphasis in original); F & S Offshore, Inc. v. K.O. Steel Castings, Inc.,
662 F.2d 1104, 1107-08 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Fed. R. Evid. 403 states that relevant evidence is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Because of its considerable discretion in admission of
evidence, reversible error is found only in exceptional circumstances. . . . In reviewing the district court
decision, an appellate court should assume the maximum probative force and the minimum prejudice to be
reasonably expected.”) (citations omitted); United States v. Stirone, 262 F.2d 571, 576-77 (3d Cir. 1958),
(“Of course the trial judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, exclude evidence which is logically
relevant to an issue other than propensity, if he finds that the probative value of such evidence is
substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission will create a substantial danger of undue
prejudice.”), rev’d on other grounds, 361 U.S. 212 (1960).
69. 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE § 403[03] (1999).
70. Andrew K. Dolan, Rule 403: The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 SO. CAL. L. REV. 220
(1976).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507, 516 n.14 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc).
72. S. 472, 102d Cong., § 231 (1991), H.R. 1149, 102d Cong., § 231 (1991), 137 CONG. REC.
S2197 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1991).
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through the Rules Enabling Act.73 In developing Rules 413-415, however,
Congress took advantage of its power to propose evidentiary rules and bypass
the Rules Enabling Act.74
After various unsuccessful attempts to enact the reforms, the proposed rules
gained new life in 1994 when Representative Molinari announced her intention
to block passage of the Crime Bill unless it included the new evidentiary rules.75
Representative Molinari insisted that “[t]he proposed reform is critical to the
protection of the public from rapists and child molesters.”76 Th  l gislative
history reveals several reasons why its sponsors believed the legislation served
this goal.77
First, the sponsors believed that rapists and child molesters have a high
recidivism rate.78 Second, the sponsors believed that the rules would enhance the
73. See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-77 (1994). This Act calls for an Advisory
Committee made up of scholars, judges and lawyers in the relevant field to draft a proposal for any
amendment or addition to the existing rules. See id. The proposal is then subjected to a period of public
comment, reviewed by a subcommittee of the United States Judicial Conference (whose members are
chosen by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court), and finally subjected to Congressional review. See id.
74. See Aluise, supra note 15, at 159-60.
75. See 140 CONG. REC. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari); 140
CONG. REC. H2433 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari). While Representative
Molinari led the effort in the House of Representatives, Senator Bob Dole blocked passage of the Crime
Bill in the Senate. See 140 CONG. REC. at S10,276 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole).
76. 140 CONG. REC. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari). See also 140
CONG. REC. H5439 (daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Kyl) (indicating new rules would result
in more convictions). Representative Molinari’s remarks no doubt made a strong impression on the
average American citizen. In a 1986 poll, 1,000 adults were surveyed and asked to rank various crimes
according to their heinousness. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Undertaking the Task of Reforming the
American Character Evidence Prohibition: The Importance of Getting the Experiment Off on the Right
Foot, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 285, 297 (1995). While murder was the crime rated most serious, rape,
incest and child abuse were the next three highest rated crimes. See Imwinkelried, supra at 297.
A 1989 study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the Department of Justice’s research department,
confirmed the conclusions of the 1986 study. See id. The researchers polled 60,000 adults in an attempt to
determine how the public perceives the relative seriousness of different crimes. Once again, homicide
received the highest rating and the next two highest ratings went to the offenses of rape and child abuse.
See id.
77. An address presented to the Evidence Section of the Association of American Law Schools on
January 9, 1993 set forth these views. For the full text of this address, see David J. Karp, Evidence of
Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases and Other Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15 (1994).
78. See 140 CONG. REC. S12,263 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1994) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“Why
should we not let the juries know . . . that these people have a pattern and series of acts that they have done
that have amounted to rape or child molestation? . . . [W]hy should it not come in? The fact is, it
should.”); 140 CONG. REC. S10,276 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole) (“[W]hen someone
is out there committing sex crime after sex crime, committing child molestation after child molestation, it
is this Senator’s view that this [propensity] evidence should be admitted . . .”); 140 CONG. REC. H5438
(daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Kyl) (explaining that rape and child molestation cases often
involve “a clear pattern of conduct by an accused who has been convicted of similar conduct in the past
. . .”); 140 CONG. REC. H2433 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari) (“The past conduct
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credibility of sexual assault and child molestation victims.79 Third, the sponsors
found propensity evidence in sexual assault and child molestation offenses
of a person with a history of rape or child molestation provides evidence that he or she has the combination
of aggressive and sexual impulses that motivates the commission of such crimes and lacks the inhibitions
against acting on these impulses.”). Recent empirical evidence suggests, however, that the crimes of sexual
assault and child molestation are not particularly probative as predictors of future conduct. A
comprehensive review of the empirical studies of recidivism rates was published in 1993 and found that
these studies report that the recidivism rate for sexual offenses is lower than the rate for other serious
crime. See Thomas J. Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in
Sex Offender Cases, 21 AMER. J. CRIM. L. 127, 149-50 (1993). These studies also report that the
recidivism rate for pedophilia is below the national average for all crimes. See Reed, supra at 151.
These findings confirm the findings of the Justice Department’s 1989 study in which the Bureau of
Justice Statistics tracked 100,000 prisoners for three years to determine the extent of their recidivism. See
ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS
RELEASED IN 1983 (1989). According to the study 31.9% of released burglars were rearrested for
burglary, 24.8% of drug offenders were rearrested for a drug offense, and 19.6% of violent robbers were
rearrested for robbery. Only 7.7% of rapists were rearrested for rape; only homicide had a lower
recidivism rate. See BECK, supra at 6.
Some commentators have suggested, however, that there are a number of reasons to believe that the
recidivism rate for rape is actually higher than these empirical studies suggest. See, e.g., David Finkelhor,
Abusers: Special Topics, in A SOURCEBOOK ON CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 119, 132 (Finkelhor ed. 1986)
(noting that ten studies of child molestation “probably gravely understate the amount of subsequent
offending committed by the men who were studied”); Judith V. Becker & John A. Hunter, Jr., Evaluation
of Treatment Outcome for Adult Perpetrators of Child Sexual Abuse, 19(1) CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 74,
82 (1992) (stating that “[u]ndetected crime is quite extensive among sex offenders and  . . .  official data
may reveal only a small percentage of the total sexual offenses committed”); A. Nicholas Groth et al.,
Undetected Recidivism Among Rapists and Child Molesters, 28 CRIME & DELINQ. 450, 453-54 (1982)
(describing an anonymous questionnaire given to convicted and incarcerated rapists and child molesters in
which, on average, the subjects indicated they committed two to five times as many sex crimes for which
they were not apprehended).
Rape is also a notoriously underreported crime, even among women who acknowledge that they were
raped. See DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION: RAPE, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, AND
WORKPLACE HARASSMENT 31 (1984) (indicating that only 9.5% of women who are attacked report the
crime to the police); Lita Furby, Mark R. Weinrott & Lyn Blackshaw, Sex Offender Recidivism: A
Review, 105 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 27 (1989) (finding that fewer than 10% of sexual offenses are reported).
Societal beliefs also may contribute to a high number of unreported rapes because of a belief that
certain acts are legal, even though they clearly qualify as sexual assault. See, e.g., HUBERT S. FEILD &
LEIGH B. BIENEN, JURORS AND RAPE 50-51 (1980) (finding that 66% of 1,056 individuals surveyed
agreed that “women provoke rape by their appearance or behavior”); Jacqueline D. Goodchilds et al.,
Adolescents and Their Perceptions of Sexual Interactions, in 2 RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 245, 268
(Ann Wolbert Burgess ed., 1988); JOYCE E. WILLIAMS & KAREN A. HOLMES, THE SECOND ASSAULT:
RAPE AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES 115 (1981) (finding that 30% of whites, 26% of blacks, and 44% of
Mexican-Americans questioned in an extensive rape survey in San Antonio defined rape as requiring an
unknown man and force or threat of violence).
79. See 140 CONG. REC. H8991-92 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari)
(discussing consent and false accusation defenses in sexual assault cases); 140 CONG. REC. S10,276
(daily ed. Aug. 2, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole) (indicating defense of attacking credibility of child in
child molestation cases); 140 CONG. REC. H5439 (daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Kyl) (“If
the defendant has committed similar acts in the past, the claims of the victim are more likely to be
considered truthful if there is substantiation of other assaults.”).
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highly relevant and probative.80 Finally, the sponsors claimed that the New
Rules would make victims more willing to come forward and confront their
attackers.81 The “Analysis Statement” which accompanied the Crime Bill
codified many of these comments and explained the purposes and policy
rationales underlying each component of the Act.82
However, these proposed rules faced vigorous criticism. Senator Joseph
Biden stressed the rules’ greatest danger: the potential for unfair prejudice to
defendants.83 Representative William J. Hughes also expressed fear that the
80. Senator Dole argued that:
The new rules will supersede in sex offense cases the restrictive aspects of Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b). In contrast to Rule 404(b)’s general prohibition against evidence of character or propensity, the
new rules for sex offense cases authorize admission and consideration of evidence of an uncharged
offense for its bearing ‘on any matter to which it is relevant.’ This includes the defendant’s propensity to
commit sexual assault. . . .
140 CONG. REC. S12,990 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole). See also 140 CONG. REC.
10,276 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole) (“Ask any prosecutor; and he or she will tell you
how important similar-offense evidence can be.”).
Commentators debate, however, whether this sort of propensity evidence truly is relevant and
probative in all cases. See supra note 78. In addition, empirical studies have found that evidence of sexual
misconduct or child molestation by the accused tends to make jurors extremely hostile towards the
defendant. The most famous study of the behavioral patterns of American jurors is the Chicago Jury
Project. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966). The researchers
investigated the potential for prejudice in sex offense prosecutions and found that many jurors consider
such conduct offensive, reprehensible and outrageous. See id. at 396-97. The research indicated that
because jurors found these crimes so reprehensible, they would often find the defendant guilty of a more
severe crime than the one with which he had been charged. See id. at 397. More importantly, the
researchers found that these offenses often cause a jury to be “so outraged by the defendant’s conduct that
it overrides distinctions of the law and finds him guilty as charged.” Id. at 396. Thus, it seems clear that
knowledge of a defendant’s prior acts, especially of sexual assault or child molestation, increases the
likelihood that a jury will convict the accused solely on the basis of these prior bad acts.
81. See 140 CONG. REC. H5439 (daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Kyl) (“[V]ictims [who
have not fully prosecuted a charge of sexual assault] are often willing to bear the burden of testifying when
they know that the person who marred their lives has also victimized others and that these revelations will
come out at trial.”). 
82.  See 137 CONG. REC. S3214, S3236 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991).
83. Senator Biden stated, “This is not a fair thing to do to an individual because it does not speak to
the elements of the crime. It does not speak to whether he was there at the place at the time and moment
and committed the crime.” 139 CONG. REC. S15,072 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1993) (statement of Sen. Biden).
Senator Biden also questioned the idea that prior sexual misconduct is more probative than other prior
crimes evidence:
[T]he truth of the matter is that is not how human nature necessarily functions . . . so there is little
probative value. The fact that the defendant may have done something ten years ago . . . may or may not
be relevant to whether or not he is at the scene of the crime of which he is being accused.. . . So I suspe t
we would not allow in evidence, for example, to suggest in a robbery case—this is not what this
amendment would do, but to make the point—that you had been convicted of drunk driving. Why would
not we allow drunk driving charges to be brought in a robbery case? Well, because it goes to character, it
makes you look like you are maybe the kind of guy if you broke that law, you may break this law. It is
prejudice without any probative value. The ultimate prejudicial nonprobative kind of evidence to be
introduced is to introduce evidence of a similar crime.
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New Rules would erect unfair barriers against the defendant.84 Oth r critics
voiced due process concerns85 and concerns that the rules’ proponents had failed
to consider their long-term effects.86
Despite the vigorous criticism of the proposed rules, Congress passed the
Crime Bill and the New Rules.87 Although Congress had bypassed the Rules
Enabling Act to enact these new rules, Congress also added a provision to the
Crime Bill directing the Judicial Conference to report to Congress any
recommendations for amending the rule as enacted.88 Thus, Congress postponed
the implementation date for Rules 413-415 for 150 days to allow the Judicial
Conference time to comment and propose alternative rules.89
The Judicial Conference submitted its report to Congress on February 9,
1995.90 The Advisory Committee, with the exception of the Department of
Justice,91 opposed the New Rules.92 The Judicial Conference “urge[d] Congress
140 CONG. REC. S15,072-73 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1993) (statement of Sen. Biden). Senator Biden clearly
stated that he was in favor of curbing violence against women and children, but not at the price of fairness:
Now remember, I’m the guy who authored the Violence Against Women Act. It has been my
crusade for the past four years to have violence against women taken seriously. . . . I, too, want to see
more rapists and child abusers put behind bars. But not at the price of fairness. And not at the expense of
what we know in our hearts to be right and just.
140 CONG. REC. S10,966, S10,967 (July 31, 1995) (statement of Sen. Biden). 
84. See 140 CONG. REC. H8990 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Hughes). See also
139 CONG. REC. S15,072 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1993) (statement of Sen. Biden) (stating that character
evidence should not be used “to blind people to looking at the real facts before them and making an
independent judgment. . . .”). 
85. See 140 CONG. REC. H8990 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement inserted into the record by
Rep. Hughes) (noting that the rules would raise “very serious constitutional questions”); 140 CONG. REC.
H5439 (daily ed. June 24, 1994) (statement of Rep. Schumer) (“Make no mistake about it my colleagues,
this would say, not just a conviction but any allegation at all would be admissible in a court, not for all
crimes but for these crimes. That is turning our system of due process on its head.”).
86. See 140 CONG. REC. H8968, H8990 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement by Rep. Hughes)
(“[The] existing rulemaking process involves a minimum of six levels of scrutiny . . . . This has gone
through none of those levels. The rule changes . . . are based on a[n] . . . amendment offered on the floor of
the Senate and had . . . twenty minutes of debate. It is procedurally and substantively flawed.”).
87. The Crime Bill finally passed after a night of closed negotiations between members of Congress.
See Jill Zuckman, Negotiators in House Outline Deal on Crime Bill, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 21, 1994, at
1.
88. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, supra note 1, at § 320935(c).
See also STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., 3 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 575, 580, 583 (6th
ed. 1994).
89. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, supra note 1, at § 320935(d).
90. See Report of the Judicial Conference, supra note 15, at 51.
91. The Department of Justice stated, “The new rules are responsive to deficiencies in the existing
rules of evidence, and the Department of Justice strongly supports their enactment.” Letter from W. Lee
Rawls, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, to Sen. Robert Dole, Minority Leader
(Apr. 24, 1991), reprinted in 137 CONG. REC. S4927 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1991). The letter continued by
arguing the “entirely sound perception that evidence of this type is frequently of critical importance in
establishing the guilt of a rapist or child molester, and that concealing it from the jury often carries a grave
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to reconsider its decision on the policy questions underlying the new rules,” and
recommended that Congress abandon the rules completely.93 The Advisory
Committee argued that the New Rules would improperly “permit the admission
of unfairly prejudicial evidence,” create trial delay by causing “mini-trials within
trials” and “diminish significantly the protections that have safeguarded persons
accused in criminal cases . . . against undue prejudice.”94 In a dition, the
Judicial Conference expressed serious reservations about the applicability of
Rule 403 to these New Rules.95
In its report to Congress, the Judicial Conference suggested an amendment
to Rules 404 and 405 to explicitly direct the court to use Rule 403 in evaluating
the probative value of evidence.96 The Judicial Conference enumerated the
following factors as relevant to a Rule 403 determination:
(i) proximity in time to the charged or predicate misconduct;
(ii) similarity to the charged or predicate misconduct;
(iii) frequency of the other acts;
(iv) surrounding circumstances;
(v) relevant intervening events; and
(vi) other relevant similarities or differences.97
risk that such a criminal will be turned loose to claim other victims.” Id.
92. See Report of the Judicial Conference, supra note 15, at 53. Lawyers, the ABA, judges and
scholars soundly criticized the proposed rules. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts
solicited comments from these various individuals and found that eighty-eight individuals opposed the
rules and only seven supported them. Only three organizations supported the rules, while twelve opposed
them. Those opposed to the new rules gave various reasons as to why they were opposed. The reasons
included that the rules were unfair (58 responses), were poorly drafted (47 responses), and contained
insufficient data on propensity (33 responses). See Report of the Judicial Conference, supra note 15, at
52.
93. Id. The Judicial Conference suggested in the alternative that the provisions of Rules 413-415
should be incorporated as amendments to Rules 404 and 405 in order to clarify any ambiguities. See id. at
54.
94. Id. at 52, 53.
95. See id. at 53.
96. See Report of the Judicial Conference, supra note 15, at 54.
97. Id. at 55. Some scholars have advocated the consideration of other factors, including:
-similarity in type between the alleged events and prior events;
-similarity in relationship between alleged perpetrator and alleged victim in each circumstance;
-similarity in settings in which the events took place;
-proximity in time; and
-frequency of other acts.
Jane Harris Aiken, Sexual Character Evidence in Civil Actions: Refining the Propensity Rule, 1997
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Despite the Judicial Conference’s negative recommendation to Congress
concerning the proposed rules, Congress ignored the report and the rules as
originally enacted became law on July 9, 1995.98
E. Rule 413’s expansive coverage and the tension between it and Rule
403
The text of Rule 413 is quite broad. Paragraph (a) states that “evidence of
the defendant’s commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault is
admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is
relevant.”99 To give significant content to Rule 413, one would have to interpret
this language as abrogating the language of Rule 404(b) and allowing all kinds
of propensity evidence.100
The most serious issue involving Rule 413 and the other Federal Rules of
WIS. L. REV. 1221, 1264.
Other scholars believe the approach should look like this:
In the first step . . . [t]he judge asks four questions and weighs four factors:
How clearly has the proponent proven that the defendant committed the uncharged act? (factor No.
1)
How probative of the material fact in issue (identity, the actus reus, or mens rea) is the uncharged
misconduct? (factor No. 2)
How seriously disputed is that material fact? (factor No. 3)
And does the proponent have other, less prejudicial evidence available to prove the fact in
consequence? (factor No. 4)
In the second step, the judge identifies the countervailing probative dangers raised by the uncharged
misconduct evidence (factor No. 5). The judge asks three questions: How prejudicial is the evidence? To
what extent will the evidence misleadingly distract the jury from the central question whether the
defendant committed the charged crime or tort? How time-consuming will the presentation of the
proponent’s evidence and the defense rebuttal be?
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 35, at § 8:03.
Mueller and Kirkpatrick suggest this approach:
In performing the FRE 403 balancing, courts should consider (1) the length of time since the prior
conduct occurred, (2) the extent to which the prior conduct is similar to the charged conduct, (3) number
of occurrences of the prior conduct, (4) circumstances surrounding or relating to the prior conduct, (5)
intervening events, (6) the inflammatory nature of the prior conduct, and (7) the strength of the evidence
that the prior conduct actually occurred, including whether it is admitted or disputed by the defendant.
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 162, at 38 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
98. Amendments by the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, U.S. Order
95-24, Nov. 15, 1999, available in WESTLAW US-Orders Database.
99. FED. R. EVID. 413.
100. In addition, because the rule includes any conduct proscribed under chapter 109A of title 18,
United States Code, the range of admissible behavior will be enlarged to include such acts as
non-aggravated sexual abuse and abusive sexual contact. For the definition of all conduct encompassed by
the New Rules, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 2246(3) (West Supp. 1997). For a discussion of this aspect of the rule,
see 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §
5414 (Supp. 1998).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss3/6
p947 note Ojala.doc 02/01/00   5:32 PM
1999] PROPENSITY EVIDENCE UNDER RULE 413 967
Evidence is how to reconcile Rule 413 with Rule 403. On its face, Rule 413
seems to force a court to include sexual misconduct evidence even if the court
determines that the various factors outlined in Rule 403 substantially outweigh
the probative value of the evidence.101 Rul  413 leaves a court very little
discretion in determining admissibility.102
Even if Rule 403 applies, two aspects of Rule 413 complicate the
application of Rule 403: first, Rule 413’s admission of character evidence for
any relevant purpose might inflate the probative value of such evidence; and
second, a court can no longer balance the possibility that the evidence might be
used to show general propensity, one traditional source of unfair prejudice.103
The legislative history behind the rules, however, seems to indicate that the
sponsors of the legislation recognized the tension between Rule 413 and Rule
403, and that the sponsors intended that the protections of Rule 403 should be
available to judges faced with prior sexual misconduct evidence.104 The probl m
is that no one informed the federal judiciary of this fact, or explained how
federal judges should attempt to balance these two rules. Thus, the federal
courts have had to determine whether to apply Rule 403 to sexual misconduct
evidence and how to balance Rule 413 against Rule 403.
101. A minority of commentators argue that Rule 413 requires admission of relevant prior sexual
misconduct irrespective of other rules. This argument centers around the rule’s use of the phrase “is
admissible,” which suggests that if the evidence is relevant, it is admissible without regard for other rules
of evidence (including Rule 403). See Duane, supra note 14; Liebman, supra note 14. For a general
discussion of the problems of language, see 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5411 (Supp. 1997). Other commentators note that such a literal
reading opens the door for evidence that is unreliable, inflammatory, confusing, or a waste of time. They
argue Rule 413 is subject to Rule 403 balancing, as evidenced by some of the comments in the legislative
history. See Duane, supra note 14.
102. The Justice Department, anticipating that judges might not be willing to allow character
evidence, stated, “Entrusting [federal] judges whose attitudes have been formed by the existing, restrictive
rules to implement a fundamentally different approach under an essentially discretionary standard would .
. . undermine the basic objective [of the new rule].” OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 27, at 760.
103. A legitimate Rule 403 argument would assert that the prior act evidence may encourage jurors
to punish the accused for past conduct, rather than focus on the currently alleged conduct. Identifying this
type of prejudice can be difficult, especially in a sexual assault case. See Richard O. Lempert, Modeling
Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1036 (1977).
104. See 140 CONG. REC. S12,990 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1994); 140 CONG. REC. S12990 (daily ed.
Sept. 20, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole) (“The presumption is that the evidence admissible pursuant to
these rules is typically relevant and probative, and that its probative value is not outweighed by any risk of
prejudice.”); 140 CONG. REC. H8968, H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari) (“In
other respects, the general standards of the rules of evidence will continue to apply, including the
restrictions on hearsay evidence and the court’s authority under evidence Rule 403 to exclude evidence
whose probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.”); 140 CONG. REC. H5438
(daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Kyl) (“The trial court retains total discretion to include or
exclude this type of evidence.”).
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III. JUDICIAL RESPONSES
Courts have generally found Rule 403 applicable to sexual misconduct
evidence.105 The Tenth and Eighth Circuits recently considered the issue of
balancing Rule 413 with Rule 403, and their decisions provide particular insight
into how courts resolve this issue.
A. United States v. Guardia106
On September 5, 1996, a federal grand jury indicted Dr. David Guardia with
two counts of sexually abusing two female patients who alleged that, during
unchaperoned gynecological examinations, he touched them inappropriately.107
At trial the government offered the testimony of the two victims and then moved
to introduce, under Rule 413, the testimony of four women who alleged that Dr.
Guardia had abused them in a similar manner.108 Dr. Guardia moved in limine
to exclude the testimony of the four women.109 The district court granted Dr.
Guardia’s motion, ruling under Rule 403 that the risk of jury confusion
substantially outweighed the probative value of the Rule 413 evidence.110 The
government appealed.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling that
excluded the evidence under Rule 403.111 The court reasoned that the 403
balancing test applies to Rule 413 evidence because when the drafters of the
105. See, e.g., United States v. Eagle, 137 F.3d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir. 1998) (asserting that courts
must conduct a Rule 403 balancing test prior to admitting evidence submitted under Rule 413); United
States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1431 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that adoption of Rule 413 without any
exclusion of or amendment to Rule 403 makes Rule 403 applicable); United States v. Akram, No. 97 CR
78, 1997 WL 392220, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 1997) (holding that “the developing consensus of judges,
lawyers and legal commentators is that Rule 403 applies to evidence otherwise admissible, including
evidence otherwise admissible under Rule 413.”); United States v. Jackson, CR. No. 95-388-FR, 1996
WL 444968 (D. Or. July 22, 1996) (finding prior bad acts of sexual misconduct not relevant).
106. 135 F.3d 1326 (10th Cir. 1998).
107. See id. at 1327. The grand jury found Dr. Guardia in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2)(A). In
addition, the grand jury used the Assimilative Crimes Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 13, to charge the defendant
with two counts of criminal sexual penetration in violation of N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11(E) (Michie
Supp. 1997) and two counts of battery in violation of N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-4 (Michie 1978). See 135
F.3d at 1327.
108. See 135 F.3d at 1327. Two of the four additional witnesses complained of excessive, direct
clitoral contact, and one complained of similarly suggestive comments. One of the witnesses complained
that Dr. Guardia improperly touched her breasts, and another complained of the defendant’s use of a
medical instrument. See id.
109. See id. at 1327. See United States v. Guardia, 955 F. Supp. 115 (D.N.M. 1997).
110. See 135 F.3d at 1327.
111. See id. at 1332.
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Federal Rules of Evidence altered the 403 balancing test, they used much more
explicit language than that found in Rule 413.112 In addition, the court reasoned
that because it had held that Rule 403 balancing applied to evidence offered
under Rule 414, and Rule 414 uses language almost identical to Rule 413, Rule
403 should likewise apply to Rule 413.113
The Tenth Circuit stated that to admit evidence under Rule 413, it must pass
four barriers:
1) the defendant must be on trial for ‘an offense of sexual assault;’
2) the proffered evidence must consist of ‘another offense of . . . sexual
assault;’
3) the trial court must find the evidence relevant—that is, the evidence
must show both that the defendant had a particular propensity, and that
the propensity bears on the charged crime; and
4) the trial court must make a reasoned, recorded finding that the
prejudicial value of the evidence does not substantially outweigh its
probative value.114
The court indicated that determining the probative value in a given case depends
on a number of considerations, including “the similarity of the prior acts to the
acts charged, the closeness in time of the prior acts to the charged acts, the
frequency of the prior acts, the presence or lack of intervening events, and the
need for evidence beyond the testimony of the defendant and alleged victim.”115
Applying all of the above factors to the Guardia case, the court held that the
testimony from the four witnesses would create a substantial risk of jury
confusion because it would transform the trial of two incidents into a trial of six
incidents.116
112. See id. at 1329. In support of its position, the court pointed to Rule 609(a)(2), which states that
convictions involving dishonesty “shall be admitted” for impeachment purposes, and to Rule 609(a)(1),
which requires a court to find that the probative value of a prior conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect
on the accused. See 135 F.3d at 1329.
113. See 135 F.3d at 1330. For those cases that have held that Rule 403 applies to Rule 414, see
United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 882 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Mann, 145 F.3d 1347,
1348 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600, 604-05 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v.
LeCompte, 131 F.3d 767, 769 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Sumner, 119 F.3d 658, 661 (8th Cir.
1997); United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488, 1495 (10th Cir. 1997).
114. 135 F.3d at 1332.
115. Id. at 1331 (citations omitted).
116. See id. at 1332. The court explained that each incident would require a description by lay
witnesses and further explanation by expert witnesses. This additional testimony might be conflicting and
overlapping. “The subtle factual distinctions among these incidents would make it difficult for the jury to
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This conclusion, however, does not fit within the court’s enumerated factors.
The court expressed concern about confusion, an aspect of Rule 403 separate
from the prejudice concern. Nevertheless, such confusion can cause prejudice.
Admission of the other acts could confuse the issues and mislead the jury into
convicting the defendant based on his previous actions, even if it had a
reasonable doubt as to his commission of the charged crime. The factors
enumerated by the Tenth Circuit as limitations on the admissibility of Rule 413
evidence do little to address this form of prejudice.
B. United States v. Mound117
In Mound, the government charged Alvin Mound with allegedly physically
and sexually abusing his daughter.118 A  trial the government sought to
introduce evidence of Mound’s prior sexual abuse of two girls, ages twelve and
sixteen.119 Mound had pled guilty to the first offense, and the government had
dismissed its investigation of the second.120 The district court admitted the
conviction under Rule 413 but excluded evidence of the uncharged offense.121
The jury convicted Mound of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor, aggravated
sexual abuse, assault resulting in serious bodily injury and assault with a
dangerous weapon, sentencing him to life imprisonment.122 On appeal, Mound
challenged the admission at trial of the prior conviction of sexual abuse under
Rule 413.123
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s findings,
holding that the district court’s application of Rule 413 and Rule 403 to admit
separate the evidence of the uncharged conduct from the charged conduct.” Id. See also WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, supra note 101, § 5412, at 273 (arguing that the potential for confusion is increased when
evidence is admitted under Rule 413).
117. 149 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 1998).
118. See id. at 800. The government alleged that Mound had abused the girl from 1993, when she
was ten, through January 1997. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id. While Rule 414 specifically addresses sexual offenses against children, the government
offered the evidence under Rule 413, and the court admitted the evidence under that rule. Therefore, the
appellate court discussed Rule 413, not Rule 414. See id. at 800 n.2.
122. See id. at 800. The seven total counts included: two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a
minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c), 2246(2); two counts of aggravated sexual abuse, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c), 2246(2); two counts of assault resulting in serious bodily injury, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6); and one count of assault with a dangerous weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
113(a)(3). See 149 F.3d at 800.
123. See 149 F.3d at 800.
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the prior conviction was not an abuse of discretion.124 Th  court of appeals
agreed with the district court’s conclusion that the uncharged offense was
inadmissible under Rule 403 because the danger of unfair prejudice and
confusion substantially outweighed the probative value of the evidence.125 The
court of appeals also affirmed the lower court’s admission of Mound’s prior
conviction because the prior conviction did not present any danger of unfair
prejudice beyond that which “all propensity evidence in such trials presents
. . . .”126
More importantly, the court of appeals discussed two actions that the district
court took in an attempt to guard against unfair prejudice in this case.127 F rs ,
the district court addressed the issue of the prior sexual misconduct evidence by
deferring its ruling until it heard the testimony of the alleged victim in closed
proceedings.128 Second, before introducing evidence of the prior conviction, the
judge issued a cautionary instruction to the jury reminding them that although
the defendant had been found guilty in a prior case, this did not mean that he
was guilty in the present case.129 Both of these actions helped further to guard
against unfair prejudice in the case.130
The difficulty with this decision, however, lies with the jury instructions. The
Mound court does very little to prevent the problem underlying the decision in
Guardia, that is, that juries might focus on the defendant’s prior convictions or
acts and disregard the lack of evidence in the instant case. Jury instructions are
124. See id. at 801.
125. See id. at 801-02.
126. Id. at 802 (quoting United States v. LeCompte, 131 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 1997)).
127. See id.
128. See id. at 801. After hearing the evidence, the district court held that the evidence of the
uncharged offense was inadmissible under Rule 403 but the prior conviction was admissible. See id.
129. See id. at 802. The instruction to the jury read: 
This defendant was convicted in 1988 of sexual abuse of a minor. This does not mean that he is guilty of
any of the charges of aggravated sexual abuse or any other offense as to which he has pled not guilty in
this case which you will be deciding. You may give such evidence and the testimony of this witness no
weight or such weight as you think it is entitled to receive. . . . [T]his evidence is being received for a
limited purpose only.
Id. Numerous scholars have indicated, however, that juries are notorious for ignoring jury instructions.
Two main articles summarize the findings from empirical studies. See Lisa Eichorn, Note, Social Science
Findings and the Jury’s Ability to Disregard Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 52 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 341 (1989); J. Alexander Tanford, The Law and Psychology of Jury Instructions,
69 NEB. L. REV. 71 (1990). One author has suggested, however, that juries tend to ignore jury
instructions because of a lack of understanding of the policy behind a rule of exclusion and a lack of
comprehension of the instruction itself. See Peter Meijes Tiersma, Reforming the Language of Jury
Instructions, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 37 (1993). These issues are compunded by the juries’ reactions to
prior sexual misconduct evidence. See supra note 80.
130. See 149 F.3d at 802.
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notoriously ineffective, and here, despite the supposed disabling instruction, the
jury still heard the evidence.131
131. See supra note 129.
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IV. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL
Rape, sexual assault and child molestation remain some of the most
troubling problems society faces, and they are certainly among the most serious
and heinous of crimes.132 Solutions to these problems must better protect
women and children and bring their attackers to justice.133 However, these
solutions should not include stripping defendants of their due process rights or
dismantling evidentiary foundations rooted in the earliest common law.
Unquestionably, Congress had good intentions in mind when it enacted Rule
413, but the rule is flawed because it effectively destroys the traditional common
law ban against propensity evidence in sexual assault or rape trials. Character
evidence is often useful, and a certain level of deference should be given to the
legislative intent of Congress, but not at the expense of a defendant’s right to a
fair trial, which is an underlying basis of our entire judicial system.
A review of the legislative history indicates a number of important premises
underlie Rule 413. The major premise must be that courts, left only to
discretionary Rule 403-type balancing, tend to exclude too much evidence of a
defendant’s prior sexual assault history in sexual assault cases.134 In addition,
Congress must have believed that sexual misconduct evidence has relatively
high probative value to show action on a particular occasion, and that the
prejudicial impact of such evidence is not likely to outweigh its probative
value.135
However, the empirical data regarding the probative value of prior sexual
misconduct evidence offers no clear indication that such evidence is more
probative than other types of evidence.136 In addition, it is unclear that the
probative value of such evidence would outweigh its prejudicial impact, given
available empirical evidence concerning the average citizen’s feelings about
sexual misconduct crimes.137 While no empirical studies exist concerning the
over- or under-exclusion of prior sexual misconduct evidence through the use of
Rule 403, no convincing reason explains why sex offense cases should be
132. See supra notes 20 and 76.
133. There is a concern that, currently, too many of these attackers are going free. See supra note 20.
134. See supra notes 78-79, 81 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 80.
136. See supra note 78.
137. Murder is consistently rated as a more heinous crime than either rape or child molestation. See
supra note 76.
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singled out to allow for a greater use of propensity evidence.138 While i reasing
the possibility that the state will prevail, the dangers to the integrity of the
judicial system are great. One author sums up this problem by stating:
Sexual character evidence carries with it a moral condemnation, and one
should be wary of rules that make moral condemnation easier. Arguing
that the defendant is a bad man and therefore should be found liable in
this case might significantly increase the probability that the [state] will
prevail, but not without some cost to the integrity of the judicial
system.139
At its core, this summarizes the main problem with Rule 413: the rule may
help increase the possibility that the prosecutor will prevail, but it damages the
integrity of the judicial system in the process. In other words, there is a clear
policy tension within Rule 413: “[H]ow far do we go in making it easier to
convict defendants, some of whom may be innocent, in order to protect victims,
some of whom may not be?”140
Any attempt to find a workable approach to balancing Rule 413 with Rule
403 must consider the question of what constitutes unfair prejudice. Rule 413(a)
clearly states that a court may admit evidence of a prior specific incident of
sexual assault by the defendant for “any matter to which it is relevant,”
including “the defendant’s propensity to commit sexual assault or child
molestation offenses, and assessment of the probability or improbability that the
138. At a fundamental level, one’s feelings about the probative value of sexual assault evidence
depends on one’s view of sexual assaults in light of other violent crimes. If one believes sexual assaults
largely are analogous to all other violent crimes, character evidence rules need not vary. Alternatively, if
one views sexual assaults as one of the physical manifestations of a male-dominated society that tends to
discriminate against and oppress women in a variety of ways, then it is reasonable to expect that male
prosecutors, judges and fact finders will approach sexual assault cases with biases that are by-products of
that societal oppression. Special rules of admissibility to compensate for these biases may be appropriate.
See Bryden and Park, supra note 19, at 583.
Wright and Graham argue, however, that despite the seriousness of rape, allowing a more liberal use
of propensity evidence is not the solution:
Rape is a serious crime and proof is often difficult, particularly in a time in which the law is trying to
increase the autonomy of women and decrease the aggressiveness of men. No one wants to return to an
era when bruises were the only persuasive evidence of lack of consent. But there are many other serious
crimes that are difficult to prove without the use of evidence of propensity—drug offenses, environmental
crimes, and official corruption. While some people want to make it easier to convict rapists, others may
want to make it easier to convict economic criminals. The reason we make it difficult to convict people is
so that the criminal law is an instrument of last resort in our efforts to solve social problems.
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 100, § 5412, at 291.
139. See Aiken, supra note 97, at 1253.
140. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 100, § 5412, at 292.
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defendant has been falsely or mistakenly accused of such an offense.”141 Thus,
Rule 413 allows the prosecution to use propensity evidence to argue that the
defendant is the kind of person who would commit sex crimes. Rule 413 does
not, however, allow the prosecution to offer propensity evidence that would
make a jury disregard the lack of evidence in the present case in order to convict
the defendant for his past actions.142 This latter use of propensity evidence is
highly prejudicial and courts should focus on this type of use when balancing
Rule 413 with Rule 403.
The courts in Guardia and Mound clearly perceived the needs of both the
prosecution and the defendants in attempting to use Rule 403 to ensure fairness.
Nevertheless, neither court clearly articulated the reasoning behind its balancing
test, and both courts struggled to separate the issue of propensity from the issue
of prejudice. Not surprisingly, striking the correct balance between Rule 413
and Rule 403 remains difficult. The factors outlined in the Guardia and Mound
cases,143 the Report of the Judicial Conference,144 and various scholarly
writings145 all offer viable approaches, but tend to include so many factors that
the analysis becomes confused. Therefore, courts should balance Rule 413 with
Rule 403 by considering the following three safeguards:
First, courts should follow the lead of the Mound court146 and the Indiana
legislature147 and require that any hearing regarding the admissibility of prior
sexual misconduct evidence be heard outside the presence of the jury.148 This
will allow the court to hear the testimony of the alleged victim, the arguments
from both sides, and then make a ruling on the admissibility of the evidence
outside the presence of the jury, thereby lessening the prejudicial effects of the
evidence.149
141. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 413.1, at 497-98.
142. One author has phrased the question as: “[W]ill the jury, upon hearing the other acts evidence
decide, improperly, to convict the accused because of the allegation that he did the other acts and for that
reason alone or primarily?” Norman M. Garland, Some Thoughts on the Sexual Misconduct
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 355, 359 (1995).
143. See supra notes 114, 115, 127-29 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 15.
145. See supra note 97.
146. See supra note 129.
147. See supra note 22. While the Indiana statute covers only child molestation cases, the language
of subsection (c), “[t]he court shall hold a hearing out of the presence of the jury regarding the
admissibility of the evidence described under subsection (a),” would be very useful in sexual assault cases
as well. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-15(c) (West 1998).
148. See supra note 80.
149. While most courts generally use this safeguard already, it is important for all courts to do so
every time a Rule 413 issue arises. This first factor does not go so far as to propose that a conference
regarding any Rule 413 issue must be heard outside the presence of the jury. Such a proposal would
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Second, courts should continue to apply Rule 403 vigorously in such
proceedings. A court should look closely at both the relevancy of the proffered
evidence and its prejudicial effect. In order to limit undue prejudice, the court
should not admit propensity evidence in Rule 413 situations if the prosecution’s
sole purpose for admitting the evidence of the prior acts is to deflect the jury’s
attention from the weaknesses of the current case. The prosecution may not use
Rule 413 to focus the jury’s attention on the defendant’s prior bad acts in the
hope that the jury will ignore the charges in the current case or disregard the
lack of evidence in the present case and convict the defendant because of his
previous actions. The court must prevent such undue prejudice through
vigorous application of Rule 403.
If the court reasonably ascertains that the prosecution seeks to use the prior
acts evidence to prove a defendant’s propensity to commit the acts with which
he is currently charged, Rule 413 clearly dictates admission of this evidence.
This does not mean, however, that Rule 403 no longer applies in such a
situation. Instead, courts should use Rule 403 when appropriate and they must
examine a number of factors in determining admissibility of the evidence.
Courts should consider factors such as the similarity between the acts, similarity
in relationship between the perpetrator and the victim, proximity in time,
frequency of the other acts, surrounding circumstances and other relevant
differences.150
Finally, like the court in Mound, courts should continue to give limiting
instructions that direct the jury to consider the evidence only for its proper
use.151 The proper uses of prior acts evidence include weighing the credibility of
the defendant, determining the identity of the perpetrator, or the other factors
outlined in Rule 404(b).152 While there is some concern over the use of limiting
instructions,153 courts generally assume that instructions effectively exclude
improper evidence from the jury’s consideration.154 A clearly written and
change the focus of this Note from a proposal for balancing Rule 413 with Rule 403 to a proposal for the
revision of Rule 413, something Congress is unlikely to do.
It should also be noted that the Supreme Court in Huddleston indicated a low threshold of proof for
uncharged conduct. A court may admit evidence of uncharged offenses if a jury could reasonably
conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that the offenses occurred. See Huddleston v. United States,
485 U.S. 681, 688-91 (1988).
150. For a list of other factors that may be considered, see supra note 97.
151. Like the first safeguard, this proposal is fairly standard, but it is important that all courts give
limiting instructions.
152. See supra note 59.
153. See supra note 129.
154. The Supreme Court has offered this rationale:
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss3/6
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effectively timed instruction from the judge to the jury after admission of
propensity evidence in a Rule 413 situation will clarify that the jury should not
use the evidence for an impermissible purpose, thereby causing undue prejudice
to the defendant. An example of such an instruction might be:
During this trial you have heard evidence that the defendant previously
engaged in a sexual offense [on one or more occasions] other than the
offense[s] charged in this case. You must decide if the defendant
committed the act in question based on the evidence adduced about that
event. This evidence may help you weigh the credibility of the defendant
or determine if he was the perpetrator of the crime on this occasion.
However, the law does not allow you to convict a defendant or to punish
him simply because he has done things, even bad things, not specifically
charged as crimes in this case.
If you find that the defendant committed a prior sexual offense, you
may, but are not required to, infer that the defendant has a disposition to
commit [the same or similar type] sexual offenses. If you find that the
defendant has this disposition, you may, but are not required to, infer that
he was more likely to commit the crime[s] of which he is accused, but
you may not find the defendant guilty solely on the basis of such
evidence. Evidence that the defendant committed a prior sexual offense in
the past is not evidence that he committed such an act in this case.155
This type of instruction allows admission of propensity evidence under Rule
413 and limits its prejudicial effects by explaining that the jury may not convict
the defendant solely on the basis of the prior acts evidence.
The rule that juries are presumed to follow their instructions is a pragmatic one, rooted less in the
absolute certitude that the presumption is true than in the belief that it represents a reasonable, practical
accommodation of the interests of the state and the defendant in the criminal justice process.
Richardson, Warden v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987).
155. This hypothetical jury instruction was drafted with the help of a number of jury instruction
books. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL §§ 2.50, 2.50.01 (Committee on Standard
Jury Instructions, Criminal, of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California eds., 6th ed. 1996);
1 FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS §§ 2.14A, 2.14B (Josephine R. Potuto, et al. eds., 2d ed.
1993 & Supp. 1993); 1 FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 17.08
(Edward J. Devitt et al. eds., 4th ed. 1992); MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE
DISTRICT COURTS OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT § 2.08 (Committee on Model Criminal Jury Instructions
Within the Eighth Circuit eds., 1994); NINTH CIRCUIT MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 2.10 (Committee on Model Criminal Jury Instructions Within the Ninth Circuit eds.,
1995); PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES) § 2.05 (Committee on Pattern Criminal Jury
Instructions First Circuit eds., 1998).
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V. CONCLUSION
By narrowing the scope of Rule 413 with the help of Rule 403, courts can
uphold congressional intent while assuring defendants the continued right to a
fair trial. The courts must fight to achieve justice for the victims of rape, sexual
assault and child molestation, but the fight should not be conducted in such a
way as to dismantle hundreds of years of common law precedent, undermine the
integrity of the judicial system, and risk the conviction of innocent people.
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